As both the skies and highways become more crowded, travellers continue to look for cheaper and efficient alternatives. The National Railroad Passenger Corporation, commonly known as Amtrak, faces increased pressure to meet this need. Notorious for failing to meet on-time standards as well as operating consistently at a loss, discussions of the implementation of high-speed rail (HSR) projects has caused increased optimism in the future of US intercity passenger rail. This study reports on research conducted in 2009 comparing US air carriers and highway travel with current Amtrak service. A discussion of HSR is included with an examination of the effects it could have on intercity transportation. Our conclusion is that Amtrak continues to compete ineffectively despite an increase in popularity and any introduction of HSR will require significant changes to current intercity rail travel system.
Introduction
With increased congestion in the air as well as on the ground, American travellers continue to seek more convenient and cost effect substitutes. Amtrak, the sole provider of intercity rail travel in the US, faces an increased burden to meet that need. Formally known as the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, Amtrak was established by the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 as a for-profit corporation with the intent to assume operation of intercity passenger train routes within the continental USA (Solomon, 2004) . Typically operating in a deficit, Amtrak has earned a reputation for poor on-time performance, which has encouraged consideration of alternatives such as high-speed rail (HSR). The following discussion will present research conducted in 2009 that compares the three main modes of travel in the US: air, highway and rail. Also included will be an examination of HSR and the potential impact it could have on intercity service.
The stimulus bill proposed by US President Barrack Obama and passed by the US Congress in 2009 included $8 billion to be spent over two years on HSR projects. These funds were intended to move forward proposed projects in several of the ten identified rail corridors in the US (Knowlton, 2009) . One of these projects would have supported an effort to construct HSR between Tampa and Orlando, Florida; however, the money ($2.4 billion) was rejected by Governor Rick Scott who believed that the plan submitted to the Federal Railroad Administration underestimated the total cost of construction and overestimated projected ridership. Similar concerns in the State of California have effectively ended this US initiative; the 2012 federal budget contained no HSR funding and the US House of Representatives has dropped all HSR funding from the five year transportation plan (Jackovics, 2012) .
At the beginning of the 19th century, water transport was the primary means of long distance travel in the US which was blessed with a large network of lakes and rivers. As agriculture began to develop in regions of the central and western US, the rail industry began to develop for passenger and freight transportation which helped to develop these regions as well as making the US a key exporter of agricultural products. Following World War II, the American railroad industry began to decline. The decline was most significant for intercity passenger rail services which ended in 1971 with the creation of the entity commonly known as Amtrak (Chant, 2005; Solomon, 2004) . At present, there are only two sections of the US passenger rail system (Amtrak) that can be classified (barely) as HSR: the Acela (Boston-DC) and part of the Keystone Corridor -HarrisburgPhiladelphia, both part of the Amtrak system (Schwieterman and Scheidt, 2007) . Although US transportation planners have tried for the past two decades to reduce US reliance on highway travel in order to lower energy consumption and the environmental impacts of road transportation, the policies put in place following World War II have proved resistant to change. The National Household Travel Survey found that 90% of all US long-distance trips were made by personal vehicle while rail travel accounted for only .001% (US Department of Transportation, 2003) . In the six decades since WWII, the passenger rail system has also faced increasing competition from air travel as this mode of transportation became safer and cheaper. Air travel now accounts for almost all of the non-road long distance trips in the US (Deen, 2003; US Department of Transportation, 2003) .
Supporters of passenger rail have offered two reasons for the decline and failure of the US passenger rail system: government support for competing travel systems, namely highways and airports, which receive government funding for the construction and maintenance of its essential infrastructure (highways, bridges, airports, etc.) and the low cost of fuel in the US. Unlike other modes of travel, rail operators must bear the full cost for the construction and maintenance of all necessary infrastructures, primarily the track. This difference can be traced to early government attitudes and policies that sought to incentivise rail expansion by granting rail operators land adjacent to newly laid track. Rail operators were expected to raise funds in private markets, build and maintain their own tracks, often competing to lay the most tracks at the least cost (Boyd, 2001; Coston, 2005; Deen, 2003) . No serious legislative proposal on US rail has suggested changing this historical model of private rail infrastructure funding and control. Within this context, models of the US transportation environment have attempted to estimate the 1 potential demand for rail travel 2 investments needed in various modes of transport 3 potential impact of HSR on the transportation mix, but, as the Florida and California example show, there has been widespread disagreement about the assumptions and costs.
Further, there is very little actual evidence in the US that HSR can compete successfully with either highway or air transportation at any distance (De Rus and Nombela, 2007; Rhoades et al., 2006) . In 2006, Rhoades et al. reported the results of a study on the competitiveness of the US passenger rail operator, Amtrak, with US air carriers in terms of fares, time-todestination, and total passengers and revenues. At the time of their study (1Q of 2005), only three of Amtrak's routes were profitable. Two of these three routes were part of the Northeast Corridor (formerly called the Acela-Boston-New York-PhiladelphiaWashington DC) and the Metroliner (New York/Philadelphia/Washington, D.C.), nominally classified as HSR. At the time, their study found that the average air fare for Boston to Washington, DC was 302.30 versus 130.00 for Amtrak while the time to destination was 73 minutes versus 5 hours, not counting travel to the airport, security, etc. For the Metroliner, the average fare was $251.00 for air transport versus $75.00 for Amtrak and the time to destination was 82 minutes for air travel versus 109 minutes for rail. Thus, it would appear that the fares/times-to-destination were acceptable to enough passengers to allow for route profitability. Both average fares and travel time are criteria that will be essential for the success of any HSR project. The ability to be competitive will serve as a make-or-break factor in the survivability and viability of HSR (Wardman, 2006) . If an international model of private operators and public infrastructure is not a policy option to be considered in the US, then the argument for HSR must rest on environmental and fuel cost/savings. In fact, one US freight rail operator (CSX) continues to run commercials touting its ability to transport one ton of freight with one gallon of fuel. At the macro-level, critics such as Robert Poole of the Reason Foundation have argued that HSR is not the lowest cost option to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG), would not contribute to reduced oil dependence, cannot compete with other subsidised modes of transportation, does not relieve congestion which is primarily an intracity not intercity problem in the US, and cannot compete in a US environment where fuel cost remain a fraction of the costs observed in other developed countries (Poole, 2010) . Rail supporters have argued that higher fuel prices would significantly increase the attractiveness of rail travel. There is some international evidence of this relation (Hall, 2001 ) and anecdotal evidence from Amtrak ridership does support this claim; Amtrak ridership did increase during the height of the 'fuel crisis' in 2008 ( Figure 1 ) and clearly appears to be related to gasoline fuel prices. The spike in fuel prices in 2008 and the relatively higher prices since this date present a real world test of the assertion that higher fuel prices would make rail a more attractive alternative. Given this serendipitous 'experiment' in fuel costs and the continuing questions of HSR viability, a re-examination of the price-time performance dynamics between Amtrak and the US airlines seems warranted. The first study, conducted in Fall 2009, examined competition between air and rail travel in terms of price and travel time using the online booking system information provided by Amtrak and competing US air carriers. Two additional studies were conducted in Spring 2010 using a third party travel site to identify the most competitive airline fares and attempted to calculate the direct cost of road travel. The goal of all studies was to assess whether higher fuel costs did indeed alter US travel behaviour and/or improve the competitive/financial performance of Amtrak. While this research does not address the question of total cost (or cost/benefit) between the modes, the implications for strategic action at the firm and government level are discussed (Poole, 2010) .
Passenger Rail in the US
The US nationalised its intercity passenger rail system in 1970 following the bankruptcy of the Penn Central Railway. At the time, Penn Central represented the largest US firm ever to declare bankruptcy (Salsbury, 1982) . It was assumed that subsidies to the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, commonly called Amtrak, would be necessary for only a short period of time, however, Amtrak has yet to cover even its own annual operating costs. Vranich (2004) estimated the total cost of Amtrak to US taxpayers at over US$27 billion. In part, these losses help to account for the fact that Amtrak had only 632 usable rail cars, many over 30 years old, when fuel prices spiked in 2008 (Wald, 2008) . While the Acela trains are capable of speeds of 150 mph, track conditions and other rail traffic bring the average speed down to just 80 mph. This compares unfavourably to other HSR systems such as the Japanese Shinkansen trains, averaging 180 mph, and the French TGV trains, averaging 133 mph on the Paris-Lyon route. (Knowlton, 2009 ). Thus, chronic underfunding has not positioned Amtrak to compete well against other modes of travel. Deen (2003) has noted that US transportation policy has been guided by three basic rules:
1 maximise the role of the private sector 2 regulate only when absolutely necessary 3 as a last resort, allow the public sector to own and/or operate the system. This general philosophy aside the US Government does spend significant amounts on transportation, however, 82% of the total funding is highway related. Deen (2003) does not deny that subsidies have played some role in the decline of passenger rail, however, he argues that the 'iron laws of time, distance, and speed' determine the relative attractiveness of different modes of travel; for trips of less than 50 miles, road travel is generally faster while air travel is faster for trips over 300 miles. The question is whether HSR in the US can compete within the gap (50−300 miles). At present, ten of Amtrak routes fall within this range ( Table 2 ). Most of the planned US HSR routes would also be within this range.
Estimating passenger rail demand
The competitiveness of HSR has been the subject of research in other regions of the world, primarily Asia and Europe. The first HSR service in Europe was launched in 1981. Within Europe, the goal is to triple the size of this network by 2025 (UBS, 2010) . Early passenger demand models in Great Britain looked almost exclusively at GDP growth. Wardman (2006) updated these models to include car time, fuel costs, and post-privatisation trends such as improved facilities, better marketing, etc. and later Wardman et al. (2007) refined the model to look at station choice, catchment areas, and access/egress to stations. Both studies noted that there appears to be significant elasticity of demand for rail travel. Clever (2006) also noted the importance of access and egress issues in consumer choice as well as certain amenities such as covered, short distance walkways. Overall, elasticity for rail travel and the number of factors that affect passenger decisions have made it difficult to estimate demand. Given the modal differences in unit cost, total cost, and demand parameters, predicting the demand changes in situations of modal competition has proved very complex.
A 2011 study of potential ridership in the Tampa-to-Orlando Florida corridor determined that by the end of the first year of operation, there would be a $10.2 million operating surplus. The study was conducted by two independent contractors for the Florida Department of Transportation using questionnaires and surveys administered at various locations along the route and included Orlando International Airport (Zink, 2011) . This was in contradiction to data provided by the libertarian Reason Foundation to Governor Rick Scott upon which he based his decision to reject federal funding for the Central Florida HSR project.
Air-rail competition
Narrowing the focus of study to two modes of travel -air versus rail, has not simplified the matter greatly. Although a study of the French market suggested that an observed 7% decline in air travel between 2000 and 2007 was attributed to HSR, it is not clear whether some of the decline represents a shift to road travel. In fact, there has been relatively little research actually looking at competition between air and rail modes of transportation, either directly surveying mode-switching passengers or tracking actual changes in consumer behaviour (shifts modal share of traffic) in situations where the two modes serve the same route (OECD, 2008) . Most of the research on air-rail competition has explored the issue through modelling. The goal has been to estimate 'potential demand' for HSR in a multi-modal transportation environment to justify (or not) governmental investment in HSR systems (Adler et al., 2010; de Rus and Inglada, 1997; Janic, 1993; Levinson et al., 1997) . A limited set of analyses have been done from a strategic perspective attempting to assess the impact of competition on individual firms and/or segments of one mode such as low cost air carriers or LCCs (Mayer, 2005; UBS, 2010) . For example, the UBS analysis suggested that the EC proposed expansion of HSR would create competition with the two main LCCs in Europe, Ryanair and EasyJet, on 16.8% of their routes (29.7% of their seat capacity), but would not threaten existing operations. The primary impact would be on the potential LCC growth in the EU (UBS, 2010) .
Several studies have used stated preference models to estimate demand and potential competition with mixed results. Gonzalez-Savignat (2004) suggested that there would be a high degree of substitutability between the modes with rail achieving market shares of 40% and 60% in business and leisure sectors while Vickerman (1997) , Martin and Nombela (2007) , and Roman et al. (2007) reach far lower estimates for market share and viability. Mayer (2005) explored whether the case could be made for replacing feeder flights in hubs with HSR made economic sense. Using a unit cost perspective, he found that HSR had lower unit costs on segments of 1,200−1,300 but using a full cost approach HSR only made sense on high density routes up to 400 km. In short, whatever the method used to estimate passenger demand and system costs the results have been mixed. In the absence of some change to the cost structure of transportation such as a real or artificial increase in fuel prices, the argument for passenger rail is not compelling. With the sudden spike in fuel prices in 2008, exploring the impact of such a change on passenger choice appeared to be prudent.
A third set of research has focused on modelling the impact of a limited set of factors on consumer preference such as variance in travel times, ground access, transfers to final destination, etc. (e.g., Cervero, 1994; Harvey, 1988; Lunsford and Gosling, 1994) and/or the competitive dynamics between air and rail (e.g., Beimborn, 1968; Morrison and Winston, 1985) . Janic (1993) concluded that HSR could compete with air transport over a large range of distances. This model assumed that all demand was met and that the goal was to minimise total system costs. However, two other studies looking at possible competition concluded that the higher infrastructure costs for rail argued against encouraging modal competition ( Levinson et al., 1997; de Rus and Inglada, 1997) . Martin (1997) and Van Exel et al. (2002) developed a cost-benefit model that included externalities and reached a different conclusion, namely that air-rail competition did make policy sense. The cost-benefit analysis of Adler et al. (2010) used a network-based model of transportation and a game theory approach for competitive reactions to explore EU air-rail competition to conclude that some of the Trans-European HSR projects could be viable. In their model, passengers were assumed to choose the travel alternative with the highest utility with utility depending on fare, travel time, distance, and routing. These utility factors would appear to be an excellent starting place for exploring the competitiveness of US air-rail transportation. 
Air vs. rail financial performance

Methods and results
Three studies were conducted to analyse the current level of competition between air and rail (Amtrak) service. The first study (Study 1) was conducted to compare Amtrak's current fares and travel times to four selected airlines that served the same routes (city pairs). This study used data collected directly from the websites of each firm. Studies 2 and 3 used an outside travel booking site in order to select the most competitive airline fares (Note: no such service exists for Amtrak fares). These two studies also compared air and rail travel features to automobile travel. The following section discusses the collection of data.
Data collection: Study 1
Fares and time: fare and time performance data on each of the Amtrak routes in operation as of September 2009 was retrieved from the online Amtrak reservation system (www.amtrak.com). The airlines selected for this study were United, US Airways, Southwest, and Jet Blue, representing two 'traditional, full service carriers, and two LCC carriers. Fare and time performance data for air service to each of the selected Amtrak routes (origin-destination) was retrieved from the four airlines direct online reservation systems (www.united.com, www.usairways.com, www.southwest.com, www.jetblue.com) . Travel time is either directly quoted as retrieved from each respective website or calculated as the difference between quoted scheduled departure and arrival times. Consistent with previous reporting, delays and on-time performance are not considered but are increasingly significant with increasing route distances. Because of this, there is a minimal effect of these factors on the most likely viable short distance routes (in other words, the shorter the route the more attractive rail service becomes to consumers due to the nature of the travel industry). For example, the increased check-in time required to pass through security in a post 9/11 world along with other 'headaches of flying' reduces the time difference between air and rail travel time for shorter distance travel. Since this is an analysis of the ability of rail service to compete with air service between selected cities, the fares and time-to-destination were further filtered to eliminate sources of competitive distortion. For example, if three of the four airlines provided direct service between two cities and the fourth provided service but through a hub, the fourth service was eliminated as travel time through the hub would adversely affect the 'competitive' average travel time. Fares and times represented also reflect the average or typical competitive quote. For example, air service quotes are affected by current booking levels. Also, flights with unusually long travel times (typically for service with connecting service) were eliminated. Effort was taken to minimise or eliminate these factors to best present typical or average fares and travel times under normal travel booking conditions. This is done to best approximate 'competitive' free market behaviour (buyer aggressively seeks the best value of price versus travel time).
Distance: for air travel, origin to destination distance data was retrieved from Aviation Tools (www.airrouting.com) which provides distances between airports based on the great circle method. For Amtrak, distance information was calculated by summing the distances of each route segment with each segment measured city-centre to city centre retrieved from (www.geobytes.com/citydistancetool.htm).
Fare difference: the difference between current Amtrak rail fare and air service. For example, the rail fare for Milwaukee-Chicago (Hiawatha) was $44 and air service for the same route was $221. $44−$221 = ($177).
Time difference: the difference for time of travel between current Amtrak rail service or HSR and air service. For example, the travel time for Milwaukee-Chicago (Hiawatha) was 90 minutes and air service for the same route was 51 min. 90 min -51 min = 39 min. Since HSR is assumed to cut travel time in half, HSR travel time for this route 20 min (rounded to the nearest min). Note: HSR assumes travel time of 1/2 normal rail travel time. Calculation of fare differences and savings per hour are not meaningful for HSR because HSR rates are not known and are likely to be higher than standard rail service.
Time value ($/hr): the ratio of fare difference to time difference for a particular route. For example, the fare difference for Hiawatha was ($177) and the time difference for the same route was 39 min. The time value is then ($177)/39min = $4.54/min. Since there is 60 min in an hour $4.54/min × 60 min/hr = $272.31/hr. Since HSR is assumed to cut travel time in half, the time values (calculated the same way) are double that of standard rail service (assuming fare remains unchanged).
Results
Tables 2(a) and 2(b) show the relative competition between air and rail transportation service in terms of price and travel time. As Table 2 (a) indicates, Amtrak has lower fares on ten out of the 24 routes selected. Furthermore, it can clearly be seen that Amtrak generally offers lower fares for routes less than 350 miles (10 out of 13). However, this is strictly considering only price. When travel time is considered, Amtrak loses competitiveness on the majority of its routes. Only two routes remain competitive when time of travel is considered: Hiawatha (Milwaukee-Chicago) and Keystone (NY-PhilHarrisburg). For the purposes of this study, rail service is considered competitive with air service if rail service travel time is within one hour of air service (determined by adding an hour to air travel time to account for check in, security procedures, and other 'headaches of flying'). On three of the remaining routes less than 350 miles, Amtrak's fare was less than or equal to $5 compared to the average airfare, which could be considered competitive in terms of price alone. It is reasonable to conclude that Amtrak can compete with air service in terms of fare price. However, when it comes to time of travel Amtrak loses its ability to compete. If it is assumed that HSR would double travel speed and therefore cut travel time in half, HSR service would improve competitiveness with air service to four routes. This suggests that HSR could potentially provide a viable alternative to air service for travel distances to a little over 200 mi. Additionally, rail service could potentially offer a valuable service when direct air service is not available to a particular destination.
As previously mentioned, Table 1 shows that Amtrak continues to operate at a loss. It does so despite offering lower prices [as Table 2(a) shows] than its airline competition on many of its routes. This is consistent with historical data that shows only the heavily utilized Northeast Corridor trains, especially the Acela Express (BOS-NY-Phil-DC) typically make a profit and account for a significant amount of system ridership (Magnuson, 2009 ). This further suggests that Amtrak cannot compete overall against airline competition due to its inability to compete in the arena of time of travel.
Table 2(b) shows the savings rate ($/hr) by traveling by rail. Obviously, travellers probably do not do these types of hard calculations when making ticket purchasing decisions. However, the results of Table 2(b) suggest that perhaps people make a judgement call, maybe on the subconscious level, similar to this but less detailed when weighing ticket cost to travel time. Some of the savings rates on shorter routes are quite striking Milwaukee-Chicago (Hiawatha) $272/hr, Capitol Corridor $172/hr, Keystone $53/hr). How a traveller values their travel time may be related to their income in terms of wages. The savings rates of Table 2(b) are at times comparable to working wages. Table 2 (b) time value rates also provide a tool to identify the window of opportunity where rail and/or HSR may be a viable competitive alternative form of travel on short to mid-range travel. 
Data collection: Studies 2 and 3
Data was gathered in Spring 2010 for city pairs and calculations were performed to further analyse performance between service types:
Fares and time: rail fares and travel times were again retrieved from Amtrak.com. However, this time data collected was retrieved from www.travelocity.com for airfare and air travel time information for the most competitive airfare and travel time. In addition, data was collected to determine the cost and travel time for automobile travel between the city pairs. To calculate cost of travel by automobile, fuel cost was assumed to be $3.00/gal and fuel efficiency was assumed to be 25 mpg. Travel times between cities for automobile travel were obtained from www.mapquest.com.
Distance: for Amtrak, distance information was calculated by summing the distances of each route segment with each segment measured city-centre to city centre retrieved from (www.geobytes.com/citydistancetool.htm). For air travel, origin to destination distance data was retrieved from Aviation Tools (www.airrouting.com) which provides distances between airports based on the great circle method. Distances between cities for automobile travel were obtained from www.mapquest.com.
Time difference: the difference of time of travel between service types including HSR service calculated in the same way as Study 1 (shown in both minutes and hours).
Fare difference: the difference between service types calculated in the same way as Study 1 shown in dollars ($).
Time value (Save/hr): the ratio of fare difference to time difference for a particular route calculated in the same way as Study 1 shown in $/hr where applicable. This translates to savings per hour where rail offers money savings at the expense of longer travel times. Note: HSR assumes travel time of 1/2 normal rail travel time. Calculation of fare differences and savings per hour are not meaningful for HSR because HSR rates are not known and are likely to be higher than standard rail service.
Results: Study 2
The data for this study is compiled and displayed in Tables 3(a) and 3(b). Table 3(a) shows there is no case where rail service offers both best fare and best time simultaneously. The single case where it offers the best time of travel is the shortest route (86 mi by rail), the Milwaukee-Chicago service. There is no other case where rail offers service with travel time within 60 min of air service. There are four cases where rail offers the best fare (Oklahoma City-Fort Worth, St Louis-KC, Chi-St. PaulPortland/Seattle, and Chicago-Denver-Emeryville). For the OKC-DFW and St Louis-KC routes, the choice to take rail over air would depend on how the traveller values their time as the difference in travel time is over 194 min and 118 min respectively for each route. When compared to travel by car with travel costs nearly identical to rail fare, the choice to take rail would also likely depend on how the traveller values their time with travel time differences of 62 min and 100 min respectively. For the Chicago-St. PaulPortland/Seattle and Chicago-Denver-Emeryville, it is very unlikely that the traveller would choose rail due to the extreme differences in travel time over nine times longer. The traveller would also not likely choose auto travel for the same reason as well as higher travel costs.
It is interesting to observe that rail offers lower fares on nine out of 14 routes compared to air service [Table 3(b) ]. Three of these routes (Oklahoma City-Fort Worth, St. Louis-KC, and Montreal-NY) offer savings that may be worth a traveller's time depending on how the traveller values their time. HSR would theoretically improve time performance against air service making six out of 14 routes competitive in terms of time of travel. Given the monetary savings and increased travel time competitiveness of theoretical HSR travel times of the three previously mentioned routes, this may be a window of opportunity where HSR may present a viable alternative mode of transportation on these identified opportunistic routes. Even with expected higher fares of HSR, there seems to be room where HSR may be competitive with air service. However, HSR would likely not be able to compete against car travel in terms of price/cost.
Rail struggles to compete against automobile travel in terms of time of travel. Rail offers some savings for long distance travel but again at the expense of significantly longer travel times. HSR would theoretically significantly improve competitiveness against automobile travel in the area of travel time. However, since fares for HSR would likely be higher than standard rail HSR would likely again struggle to compete against automobile travel in terms of costs. 
Results: Study 3
The data for this study is compiled and displayed in Tables 4(a) and 4(b). Reviewing these tables, the results are similar to that of Study 2. Table 4 (a) shows there is no case where Amtrak offers both best fare and best travel time simultaneously. Table 4 (b) shows that all but the Milwaukee-Chicago (Hiawatha) service, which actually had the best travel time for its route, had travel times in excess of an hour longer than that of air service. At the time of this study, no airline offered direct service between Milwaukee and Chicago to compare with the Hiawatha service. Amtrak offers many lower fares (sometimes significantly) compared to air service. Amtrak offered the lowest fares/costs on seven of the 22 routes compared to both air service and car travel. On the first three routes (up to approximately 350 miles) the Chicago-Detroit (Michigan Services), Chicago-St. Louis-KC (Missouri River Runner), and Chicago-Quincy-St. Louis-Carbondale (Illinois Service) had fares significantly lower than air service. However, none of these rail services have travel times comparable to air service (within one hour). In addition, in all three cases the price difference was less than $5 compared to travel by car. This difference would not justify taking rail over car travel when time of travel is considered. The last four of seven routes with the lowest rail fare would be very unlikely chosen by a traveller over air service due to travel times nearly ten times longer than air service or more (NY-New Orleans, Chicago-Portland, Chicago-LA, Chicago-San Francisco). Air service offers the shortest travel times on 19 total routes. Travel by car offers the lowest travel costs on 13 routes with nine of them on the routes less than 350 mi. Comparing rail vs. car, rail travel struggles to compete when both cost and travel time are considered. The NY-Harrisburg (Keystone) had favourable travel time compared to car travel, but its fare was $25 more than estimated automobile costs. The Oklahoma City-Fort Worth (Heartland Flyer) and the Chicago-Quincy-St. Louis-Carbondale (Illinois Service) also had arrival times within an hour of auto travel with competitive fares. Outside of these few instances, rail had little to offer to compete with either air or auto travel. It is interesting to note that rail service offered lower fares on all but two routes compared to only air service. When the rate of savings per hour is calculated, the value of a traveller's time may become a consideration. Rail offers reasonable to considerable savings on 15 routes. Eleven of these are routes up to approximately 350 miles. HSR would theoretically improve rail travel time to make HSR preferential over air service on four routes (Rutland-NY, Chi-StL-KC, Montreal-Albany, and StAlbans-DC). Given that current rail service offers considerable savings over air service, HSR may be quite competitive on these routes even if HSR fare are higher than standard rail rates. In addition, HSR would have two routes offering service within one hour of air service (the Auburn-San Jose and the NY-Harrisburg). This would make HSR a viable alternative to air service on a total of six routes.
Auto travel currently offers lower costs and shorter travel times on the majority of routes with short to mid-range travel distances. Rail service on the three routes with lower fares, the savings is less than $5 over car travel which would not justify taking rail over a car when travel time is considered. It is interesting to note that rail service offers savings compared to car travel on long distance routes. This may be an attractive option for travellers that do not want or like to drive such long distances. 
(1.0) The HSR Acela Express (Bos-DC) offered service that beat auto travel time by 30 min, but at an additional cost of $15. Theoretically, HSR would improve travel time performance on all but one route to make it the preferred mode of travel over car when considering only travel time. Again, however, since HSR fares would likely be higher than current rail fares, HSR would not likely be able to compete with auto travel in terms of travel costs.
Discussion
Based on our findings, the competitive situation of the existing US passenger rail operator, Amtrak, appears bleak. For distances over 350 miles, the current lower fares are unlikely to offset the long travel times, if the purpose of travel is getting from A to B rather than the pleasure of the journey itself. For distances less than 350 miles, the choice of rail service over air or automobile travel would depend on a number of factors, but time-to-destination is clearly one of the most obvious discriminators. As Tables 2(a) and 2(b) showed, Amtrak offered monetary savings on the majority of routes less than 360 miles (10 out of 13), however if these savings are translated into savings per minute or savings per hour (derived from additional time spent traveling by rail), then the magnitude of the savings begins to diminish rapidly. Still, this might be sufficient for routes less than 175 miles. Assuming that HSR would double the speed of travel, Table 2 (b) shows rail service becoming competitive on two more routes (for a total of four), the NY-Harrisburg (Keystone) and the NY-Phil-DC (Metroliner which is already technically HSR, but again its speed only averages about 80 mph). Thus, HSR service could be competitive against air travel at distances up to about 200 miles. Although data was not available for the Downeaster, it would likely be a candidate for HSR with a route distance of only 99 miles. Again assuming that HSR cuts time of travel in half, Tables 3(b) and 4(b) show that HSR presents a competitive form of travel against automobile travel in terms of travel time. However, since HSR pricing would likely be higher than standard rail, HSR would not likely be competitive with auto travel in terms of fuel costs. This assumption would depend on the level of subsidisation by the government. None of these results support the contention that Amtrak as currently configured and operated is capable of providing viable national, intercity passenger rail service, even on its limited route structure. Lower fares do not attract additional riders; they simply reduce revenue. Declining revenues then prevent Amtrak from investing in improvements that would reduce travel time, maintenance delays and poor travel conditions. There are potential considerations other than fare price and time of travel when travellers choose their mode of travel. The present studies do not take these into account. For example, several previous studies have found that the single most important predictor of car use is car ownership itself (Barff et al., 1982; Deileman et al., 2002) ; if you own it, you tend to use it! The automobile certainly provides flexibility and convenience. Further, having access to a vehicle during the entire duration of travel (as compared to just the days of transiting from city to city) is a desirable benefit of automobile travel. This consideration can be very appealing to the traveller and has value in determining method of travel. This suggests that HSR may be a more attractive alternative means of transportation in areas where automobile travel is cumbersome because highways are congested highways, parking is expensive and/or scarce such as New York, NY or congestion pricing raises the cost of automobile travel. There are onboard travel conditions that may affect a traveller's decision on mode of travel. Travel comfort may be a critical factor when considering the increased travel time associated with rail travel. Security is another issue when determining a mode of travel. Security is paramount in air travel, especially in a post 9/11 world, although it is also a key source of additional travel time. Still, travellers may not be comfortable with current security levels on rail service, especially if their preconceived idea of rail travel is similar to that of a subway. Lastly, it is apparent that some airlines have developed dedicated direct air service for heavily travelled routes with extremely low fares, especially the Acela Express route. Regular and frequent direct air service at low prices makes air travel convenient and cost efficient for travellers.
In addition to the failure to account for these other factors in travel mode decision, these studies considered only the currently existing passenger rail system and did not attempt to assess any air-rail competition on the 'potential' HSR projects. For the most part, these proposed projects do NOT correspond to any of the existing Amtrak routes. The rail system in the US was laid out many years ago and even then often did not link major cities as much as create them. Further, the track, privately financed by the railroads themselves, was designed for least cost construction (going around hills, rivers, etc. and containing few closed crossings). This makes much of the existing rail unsuitable for HSR (Solomon, 2003; Vranich, 2004) . Of course, many US cities did not experience significant growth until after the advent of the automobile. For example, one of the proposed HSR projects would run across central Florida from Daytona Beach through Orlando to Tampa. This area has witnessed most of its growth within the last 40 years. There is also no existing direct air route from Daytona to Tampa so the only major mode competition would come from car travel. Thus, in reality, if a planner were to lay out a HSR system today, it would have very different network and operational characteristics. Still, our results do appear to show that a well thought out system has the potential in an age of higher fuel prices to compete with air and even automobile.
Conclusions
From the results of Studies 1, 2 and 3 it is reasonable to conclude, again, that despite offering lower or competitive fares on many of the city pair travel routes, Amtrak's rail service simply cannot compete with air service in the arena of travel time, especially for mid-to-long distance travel (over 350 miles). It is also reasonable to conclude that for shorter routes (up to 350 miles) where rail has the potential to be competitive, it still cannot compete with automobile travel in the areas of either cost, time of travel, or both and is generally not a practical substitute for travel by air or car. There are only a few routes where Amtrak is competitive with car travel. However, even in these cases, rail travel has difficulty in competing with the added conveniences offered by car travel.
HSR offers the opportunity to reduce travel times by rail significantly. Because current rail fares offer savings over air travel, HSR may compete well against air service on certain identified routes in terms of both fares and travel time. HSR fares will likely be dependent on the level of government subsidisation but will likely be higher than current rail fares. However, there is room between current rail and air fares where HSR may have the opportunity to compete. Ultimately, rail and/or HSR may only be able offer an attractive viable alternative service in narrow, opportunistic, niche markets.
Again, if HSR were to be considered, the current Amtrak system would not be desirable for the reasons discussed above. Unfortunately, the very existence of Amtrak impedes the private development of HSR as Amtrak currently has access priority to the existing rail system making private investors reluctant to invest in ventures in which they do not have first right of use. The current Amtrak system would need significant upgrading with equipment and systems to enable further HSR operations. For HSR to succeed, it would most likely need to start with private investors (and some form of government support) and hope that either natural or artificially created high fuel prices continue.
